L’articulo analiza el process de integracion territorial de la Union Europea. En la aventura europea han sido generalmente los exitos indirectos a revelarse como los mas productivos; y su incidencia se revela aun mayormente en las politicas [...]]]>

International Forum on the Social Science, Policy Nexus (IFSP), Unesco-Most, 20-24 Feb., MERCOSUR, Montevideo (UR), 2005.

L’articulo analiza el process de integracion territorial de la Union Europea. En la aventura europea han sido generalmente los exitos indirectos a revelarse como los mas productivos; y su incidencia se revela aun mayormente en las politicas territoriales. Hoy en dia son evidentes las dificultades resultante del crecimiento de los conflictos y del debate ideologico sobre el gobierno del planeta. La Union Europea – aun con sus mil contradicciones- es un experimento ‘regional’ que va en la direccion de un gobierno mundial de la economia y del medio ambiente, es asimismo un experiemento limitado y atacado. Es una negociacion politica en marcha, a veces dinamica, a veces estatica, en la cual se elaboran nuevas politicas inovativas con concepciones de nuevas escalas.

Esta perspectiva hace particularmente interesante la vision territorial del experimento europeo, dado que el territorio no esta en el centro de quien sostiene la integracion de los mercados o la prioridad de la cohesion social. Sin embargo el territorio es un area en aumento de policy, politicas y una fuente creciente de mobilidad para los recursos que nutres el proyecto europeo.

politiquas urbanas, integracion territorial, Union Europea

The high‑rise housing issue stands in between different approaches, as the simple matter of definition points out quite clearly. The high-rise “label” (here in after, a building with 5 storeys [...]]]> scarica il testo

The high‑rise housing issue stands in between different approaches, as the simple matter of definition points out quite clearly. The high-rise “label” (here in after, a building with 5 storeys upward, plus ground level) is meant to indicate a dwelling type different from the common ones: a highly abstract and impersonal physical environment, or a distinctive pattern of social life, often held together by a prevalent public provision. No one of these definitions is easily tenable with the Italian case.
So, what is meant by high-rise?
High-rise buildings are quite widespread and, although they are far from being the majority of buildings, they are often the dominant feature of urban outskirts in major metropolitan areas. In fact, a massive belt has been built since the post war years around the old industrial cities.
Taken as a way of living, high-rise buildings gained a bad reputation (Coleman 1985) for anonymity, lack of facilities and segregation. But direct links between buildings and people are highly problematic. The problem is than to deal with the urban as well with the dwelling condition. These peripheral areas have played the role of a “learning machine” for, for instance, new immigrants in towns. Many post-war films by “neo-realismo” directors, or even by Pasolini (Fofi 1982) narrate the hard urban apprenticeship of the immigrants from the most deprived rural regions in cities like Rome, Milan and Turin.
Finally, as a form of housing provision, social housing and high-rise do not coincide at all, partly due to the small size of the social housing sector in Italy (actually, about 5% of the overall dwelling stock: Ferracuti and Marcelloni 1982; Padovani 1984 e 1996; Tosi, 1990).

The first part of the Report considers the activities of planning and development control, expressed by the various institutional actors and in various forms, not so much in their absolute, regular dimension, significant as this may be: Laws (national, regional), [...]]]> Scarica il Report Inu 2000 (a cura di P. Properzi, cura dell’ed. ingl. di M.C.)

The first part of the Report considers the activities of planning and development control, expressed by the various institutional actors and in various forms, not so much in their absolute, regular dimension, significant as this may be: Laws (national, regional), national Programmes and Plans, regional Plans and Frameworks, provincial and municipal Plans) as in their relations, in a perspective of reform of the country.

Many things are changing, very quickly, more than a report is able to grasp by drawing on quantitative data; this change concerns a complex, tendentially rigid planning system, which tends to maintain (defend) precisely the most solid parts, making them paradoxically less open to change. With respect to this uncertain transition phase a number of questions emerge however, and it will be useful to focus on them also to understand better and to help this change.

Un evento “inatteso”

Il Giubileo del secondo millennio dell’era cristiana è un evento particolare per il mondo e una tappa particolare per Roma, di cui sono fortemente temute le ricadute organizzative e funzionali sulla città, soprattutto in termini di ingorghi del traffico e saturazione dei servizi.

Non sono [...]]]>

1. in Dossier di Urbanistica Informazioni, 1998

Un evento “inatteso”

Il Giubileo del secondo millennio dell’era cristiana è un evento particolare per il mondo e una tappa particolare per Roma, di cui sono fortemente temute le ricadute organizzative e funzionali sulla città, soprattutto in termini di ingorghi del traffico e saturazione dei servizi.

Non sono ancora delineate del tutto le componenti del quadro previsionale, ma già appare tempo di riflettere –soprattutto in termini comparativi – su alcune delle caratteristiche generali delle strategie urbane a fronte dei grandi eventi.

Ma nel giudizio sulle capacità di gestione andrebbe introdotto una dimensione di prospettiva. Non sempre l’accoppiamento di progetti urbani e di grandi eventi si è rivelato fertile. Per esempio, il regime fascista si impegnò molto nella realizzazione a Roma di un quartiere direzionale esemplare per un evento, l’Esposizione Universale del ’42, che non si tenne mai. Il grande Giubileo del secondo millennio promette il contrario: un grande evento che non si accompagna alla realizzazione di alcun grande progetto.

La riflessione che segue tralascia gli aspetti più interpretativi delle politiche urbane e delle vicende procedurali, già trattati altrove (¹), ed è rivolta ad esaminare soprattutto l’eredità che l’evento lascerà presumibilmente a Roma, anche ai fini di una riflessione comparativa con le altre città.

Il contesto e la natura dell’evento

Il Giubileo è un appuntamento religioso, una festa di riconciliazione che si celebra con certa periodicità, in linea di massima ogni 25 anni salvo casi eccezionali. Il credente si mette in viaggio per raggiungere il centro spirituale del cattolicesimo dove visita S. Pietro e i luoghi principali di devozione. Non che tale percorso non si possa compiere individualmente in un momento e in un luogo qualsiasi della propria vita, come la visita alla mecca dei musulmani. Ma la condivisione con altri pellegrini dell’esperienza del viaggio è parte integrante della ricerca di spiritualità; e viceversa, l’arrivo a Roma, la visita dei luoghi sacri e della sede del Pontificato sono altrettanti punti fermi dell’Anno Santo.

Visto però dall’ottica della città che lo ospita, il Giubileo appare un’occasione intrattabile e un po’ sfuggente. In parte, come argomenteremo poi, dipende dalla strategia che fa degli “eventi” un’occasione di sviluppo per le città, tema di attualità nel contesto della competizione tra le città europee. In parte dipende dalla natura particolare dei singoli eventi.

Di tutti gli eventi, il Giubileo è il più anarchico e indisciplinato. Alcuni vincoli interni che rendono il Giubileo un evento poco trattabili. Per esempio, la durata di oltre dodici mesi difficilmente lo rende assimilabile ad altri eventi “straordinari”. Non giova peraltro che l’organizzazione dell’evento segua regole complesse: a tutt’oggi il calendario delle ricorrenze dell’Anno Santo non è stato definito, con le prevedibili conseguenze per chi cura gli aspetti organizzativi. E particolarmente delicati sono i rapporti tra le tre entità dotate di poteri distinti (lo Stato Pontificio, la Repubblica Italiana e il Comune di Roma). La coincidenza del cambio di millennio evoca peraltro delle risonanze epocali a cui non sono indifferenti né gli spiriti laici né le agnostiche forze di mercato.

In sostanza è un evento imposto alla città, per il non trascurabile dettaglio che le sue componenti principali sono indipendenti e non governabili. Il gioco del Giubileo prevede infatti che si attrezzi a servizio di un evento a scatola chiusa: l’“offerta” è gestita dal Vaticano, che pur collaborando risponde a criteri, tempi e gerarchie lontane dal senso comune; la “domanda” è alimentata dalle organizzazione periferiche della chiesa cattolica mondiale, in gran parte esse stesse autonome.

Roma è la città sacra del cattolicesimo che è a sua volta componente importante d’una delle religioni mondiali. Roma è il centro, ma l’area geografica di riferimento del cattolicesimo è più vasta di analoghi centri, ecc. I cattolici sono numerosi e ampiamente diffusi in almeno quattro continenti. Inoltre, figurano in percentuali consistenti sia tra le nazioni e le popolazioni più ricche che tra le più povere del pianeta. Questi elementi, insieme alla facilità dei trasporti da e per i maggiori bacini (la stessa Italia, Polonia, Belgio, Spagna nel continente europeo; Irlanda, Usa, America Latina nel resto del mondo), alla volatilità dei cambi monetari, alla particolare organizzazione semi-gerarchica delle parrocchie che gestiscono i pellegrinaggi in una sorta di autonomia che ricorda il franchising, rendono estremamente difficoltoso ogni esercizio di previsione e di controllo sul lato della domanda.

Al momento dobbiamo fare credito alle stime che sono state avanzate dalla Agenzia del Giubileo, che presentano previsioni imponenti ma non estreme. Si attendono infatti nel corso dell’intero anno circa 24 milioni di arrivi (stima Agenzia del febbraio 1998) a fronte dei circa 8 milioni attuali (1997). Vanno inoltri aggiunti 5 milioni di presenze in coincidenza di particolari ricorrenze, come la festa mondiale della gioventù. Poiché si stima che il soggiorno dei pellegrini sarà di due notti, più breve dunque di quello dei visitatori usuali, il “carico” del Giubileo misurato in presenze dovrebbe passare dai circa 21 milioni attuali a 45 milioni (tenendo conto sia della permanenza in albergo, che della ospitalità presso istituti religiosi e case private).

Effetti sulla città

Il primo effetto del Giubileo dunque è di moltiplicare di un fattore 2 o 3 a seconda degli indicatori la presenza di visitatori. Pur nella incertezza delle stime, è una prospettiva importante, che collocherebbe Roma -almeno provvisoriamente- al rango delle città capitali del turismo mondiale, a livello cioè di Londra e New York.

L’industria turistica di Roma appare sostanzialmente inadeguata sia in termini quantitativi che qualitativi. La disponibilità alberghiera di posti letti a Roma è limitata (84.400) e, incredibilmente, non sarà incrementata da qui al 2000. Diversi espedienti sono stati individuati per ampliare l’offerta. Parte dell’ospitalità verrà gestita da istituti religiosi e da privati, parte da strutture provvisorie per far fronte ai picchi, parte ancora verrà dirottata su città prossime. Ma anche considerando l’offerta dell’intera regione o, in un raggio di 300 km, città come Firenze e Napoli, il sistema ricettivo non è altezza né dell’evento né delle aspirazioni. Inoltre, l’offerta alberghiera risulta troppo costosa per un turismo povero e di massa, come quello atteso per il 2000.

D’altra parte, le interconnessioni dell’evento Giubileo con altri fattori di centralità turistico culturale sono possibili, in principal modo con il patrimonio culturale e archeologico della città.

Da questo punto di vista, anche in virtù di alcune fortunate coincidenze, l’offerta culturale di Roma è stata fortemente potenziata in questi anni. All’interno del programma di opere del Giubileo, inoltre, il recupero del patrimonio culturale è stato ampiamente considerando, godendo da tempo di una notevole capacità propositiva e realizzativa. Nel complesso, l’offerta museale ed espositiva della città è aumentata più negli ultimi anni che nei 50 precedenti, ed è stata coerentemente premiata da un consistente aumento nei visitatori. Ciononostante, la città è ancora carente in termini di offerta di servizi e di organizzazione del turismo culturale, e soprattutto manca di una chiara strategia in questo senso.

Non è chiaro per esempio se è stata compiuta una scelta di specializzazione turistico culturale e se la gestione del Giubileo la favorisce. Da un alto, la proiezione internazionale che proviene dal Giubileo è probabilmente il vantaggio più cospicuo che la città ottiene dalla gestione dell’evento. D’altra parte, appare difficilmente gestibile in termini positivi: la città non si percepisce e non intende presentarsi alla pari di città come Gerusalemme, La Mecca, Benares.

La riflessione comparativa sulle strategie urbane dovrebbe aiutare a illuminare le condizioni che consentono di coniugare eventi e progetti urbani, congiunzione che appare il punto più debole della vicenda romana. Probabilmente vi sottosta un errore di prospettiva nella valutazione degli effetti dell’evento.

La concentrazione

A questo proposito, è stato finora evidenziato che la geografia delle visite dei pellegrini è fortemente concentrata nel tempo e nello spazio. Il visitatore del 2000 si recherà prevalentemente a S. Pietro, principalmente nei periodi dell’anno e della settimana che già oggi registrano le maggiori punte.

Le stime svolte dall’Agenzia per l’Area di S. Pietro prospettano un incremento fino a 5 volte i visitatori attuali nelle udienze settimanali del papa, con punte di oltre 300.000 persone nell’area della Basilica. Considerando che la metà dei pellegrini si muoverà in autobus, è facile considerare le difficoltà in termini di congestione e parcheggio.

Altre aree della città saranno coinvolte, principalmente le Basiliche maggiori e i luoghi di devozione di singole comunità nazionali, alcuni monumenti turistici e musei più importanti, nonché stazioni, metro, ed aeroporti, con un ulteriore problema di dislocazione da un punto all’altro della città dei 120.000 visitatori presenti in media ogni giorno.

I trasporti sono stati il settore maggiormente penalizzato dalle vicende dei piani di intervento. Nuove infrastrutture di trasporto pubblico non sono realizzabili in tempo utile, e anche gli interventi sulla rete stradale sono stati molto ridimensionati rispetto alle ambizioni. Addirittura alcuni aspetti cruciali di assetto dei trasporti sono ancora incerti.

Ragionevolmente, dunque, l’attenzione è stata spostata verso la gestione dei flussi e verso gli aspetti organizzativi e gestionali che li governano. Una parte rilevante del programma di investimento per il Giubileo andrà indirizzata in questa direzione, principalmente su materie quali il coordinamento dei servizi pubblici sanitari e di sicurezza, il sistema informativo, tecnologie di controllo e prenotazione a distanza, ecc.

La gestione dei grandi flussi di persone (la Roma di Sisto V offre ancora insegnamenti di attualità) riposa su dei semplici dispositivi: la zonizzazione degli spazi, la segmentazione dei flussi, la creazione di interfacce dedicate. Nel caso di Roma è risultato necessario concentrarsi su quest’ultimo aspetto, proprio perché la gestione dei precedenti risulta in qualche modo obbligata.

Le interfacce individuate consistono principalmente in tecnologie, strutture e personale volte a orientate e accompagnare lo spostamento dei gruppi di pellegrini su percorsi pressoché obbligati. Una scelta vincolata, nella situazione data, ma non impropria a confronto con modelli diversi dove uno stretto controllo (p. es., nell’accesso alle manifestazioni sportive) o al contrario l’assenza di filtri (escluso il biglietto: cfr. Disneyland) non esimono comunque dai rischi di code e congestione.

In definitiva, è possibile proporre il seguente schema di valutazione dei probabili esiti delle azioni programmate in vista del Giubileo.

Programmi Esiti

Ricettività - +

Offerta culturale +++ ++

Mobilità - —

Gestione dell’accoglienza +++ +++

Come già detto, si tratta di un risultato molto diverso da quello inizialmente prospettato e, in qualche misura, di un risultato modesto rispetto alla entità dell’evento.

Il dubbio che suggerisce e che peraltro è stato spesso sollevato, al di là delle vicende proprie a Roma, è il seguente: è nella natura degli eventi offrire tutte le magnifiche ricadute positive che di solito vengono loro attribuite, oppure c’è un fattore di fascinazione del circuito politico che cede alla prospettiva di vantaggi indiretti, non necessariamente impropri, ma comunque poco attinenti alla occasione che li giustifica?

Il fascino degli eventi

Questa domanda è di particolare attualità per almeno due condizioni ricorrenti in Europa.

La prima, è quella delle città d’arte a forte attrattività turistica, per le quali sono per l’appunto allo studio sistemi di selezione dell’offerta, di controllo degli accessi, di sostegno all’incontro tra domanda e offerta.

La seconda situazione è quella, più generale, originata dalla scarsità di risorse proprie che indirizza le città a sviluppare politiche finalizzate alla acquisizione di risorse esterne.

Questa è la radice di un atteggiamento favorevole alla moltiplicazione di eventi (Olimpiadi, le Fiere, i Festival, i Giochi) e naturalmente alle opere e progetti urbani connessi (stadi, palacongressi, auditorium, ecc.).

Ovviamente non si tratta di una risposta semplice, ma ci sono almeno tre dimensioni che sono state messe in luce dal dibattito e che possono essere, con molto schematismo, restituite in questo modo:

• i sostenitori affermano che gli “eventi” forniscono la massa critica necessaria alla realizzazione di opere di interesse generali; il ragionamento semplice ha sovente la struttura del calcolo economico, ma si regge sul non dimostrato postulato della complementarietà tra l’”ordinaria” dotazione infrastrutturale e lo “straordinario” contributo dell’evento specifico. In realtà questo calcolo complesso, non è sempre soddisfacente neanche nei casi più semplici degli stadi sportivi (²), mentre per grandi progetti urbani entrano in giocano fattori difficilmente quantificabili. A prescindere dai punti tecnicamente deboli delle metodologie di previsione degli impatti economici, il punto essenziale è che gli eventi di massa richiamano consumatori a reddito basso, che materialmente spendono poco nella città di destinazione;

• i detrattori fanno presente gli effetti distorcenti dello stravolgimento delle regole amministrative ordinarie, delle convenienze economiche e, in particolare, del gioco politico, che si surriscalda in una sorta di “festival” promozionale (³). La posta in gioco è la mobilitazione di risorse aggiuntive rispetto ai normali flussi finanziari e, spesso, l’attivazione di consenso politico. Paradossalmente, sono questi gli esiti che una buona attività di lobbying riesce il più delle volte a garantire.

• altri ancora mettono l’accento sui caratteri qualitativi connessi in generale alle grandi trasformazioni: gli eventi consentirebbero una discontinuità, un salto di scala, una rottura della linea evolutiva di un milieu rafforzando, si può dire, il carattere di esternalità positiva della città (⁴). E’ la tesi delle catastrofi benefiche, dei vincoli esterni, dell’opportunità in una parola di uno “shock” per recuperare gli elementi di debolezza (si pensi a cosa è stato il processo di integrazione europea per l’Italia). Gli esiti in questo caso vanno giudicati volta per volta, ma la posta in gioco è la rivoluzione culturale che produce un orientamento nuovo delle risorse umane, tesi felicemente riassunta nella categoria dell’“azzardo”. In questo senso, le politiche urbane dei grandi eventi sarebbero scelte consapevolmente orientate ad aprire nuove prospettive non interamente calcolabili.

Recentemente, è stata proposta una definizione di città “come economie del movimento”, dispositivi cioè che distribuiscono nello spazio i flussi di persone, e condizionano in parte le cosiddette economie esterne (Hillier 1996).

Per analogia, possiamo definire i grandi eventi come dispositivi che distribuiscono nel tempo il “movimento” di grandi folle, e determinano economie di scala. Questa analogia permette di evidenziare il presupposto comune alle politiche di cui discutiamo oggi: l’uso della folla generata dagli eventi .

A. Bailly et al., “Changing cities, restructuring, marginality and policies in urban Europe”, European Urban and Regional Studies, 3,2 , 1996

M. Cremaschi, “Folla come risorsa”, Croma Ricerche, 4, 1997

M. Cremaschi, “La ribellione degli Eventi”, ibidem, 1-2, 1998

C. Calvaresi, L’Agenzia del Giubileo a Roma, Urbanistica, 110, 1998

B. Hillier, “City as movement economies”, in Space is the machine, Cambridge UP, 1996.

K. L. Shrospshire, The Sports Franchise Game, Cities in pursuit of Sports Franchises, Events, Stadiums, and Arenas, Pennysilvania UP, 1995.

M. Venturi, Grandi eventi, la festivalizzazione delle politiche urbane, Il Cardo, Venezia 1994

Urban regeneration programmes are not common in Italy; in general, Italian urban policies do not offer a wide spectrum of such experiences. Only in the last twenty years has there been an attempt to turn around the [...]]]>

Urban regeneration programmes are not common in Italy; in general, Italian urban policies do not offer a wide spectrum of such experiences. Only in the last twenty years has there been an attempt to turn around the dilapidation of poor neighbourhoods, on one hand; and social exclusion, on the other. These two issues do not always coincide, and the historic limit of Italy’s model of intervention is the superimposition (with poor dialogue) of initiatives of urban renewal and social support. Besides, the assessments are still partial, and outcomes have been weakened because the initiatives were discontinuous.

The limits of urban policies, like the policies for the local economic development in regions of the South, have been pinpointed since the beginning. The problems of the city emanate from traditional Italian dualism. One should note that the cities of Southern Italy are the poorest, with the highest rates of unemployment, and the most fragile economies in Italy. In other words, the State and the trust in institutions and collective actions are weaker, due by the way to the distorting presence of organized crime.

In these conditions, the establishment of programmes of urban regeneration is more than difficult. Therefore, it is worthwhile to question whether the same requirements and models apply, as those adopted by the other programmes to urban regeneration.

Therefore, the questions raised by the experience of Bagheria are both general and specific, but they have to be faced before moving on to the discussion of the case-study:

• the first question concerns the nature of the local programme and integrated actions, and asks if they can locally challenge general problems;

• the second question concerns the compatibility between sophisticated models of intervention expected for an urban regeneration programme, and the presence of distorted private interests, capable of guaranteeing ‘omertà’ – an agreement of silence – or even support, in a context where the legitimacy of collective action is weak;

• finally, the third question concerns the implementation of the integrated model to building renewal and social actions as requested by the Urban experience (and precedent programmes from different countries).

To address the first question, we must remember that the assumption of the local urban regeneration programmes, such as those for economic development, is to mobilize social capital.

This expectation is common to all the programmes aimed at promoting endogenous development, such as those aimed at the local economy sustained by Structural Funds.

In order to promote the social and physical regeneration of the city, the programmes aim to mobilize local participants and resources, and a beneficial circulation of the ‘implicit knowledge’ of the depositories. This activation allows ‘dormant’ local resources to be made available, and to create the cultural and social preconditions necessary to begin long-term development projects. In other words, it relies on the conviction that social regulations are unavoidable and decisive preconditions for development, next to and before material factors, the level of public investments, etc. By now, this conviction is commonly accepted as far as the economic development of national economies is concerned; even more so, when it is applied in deprived neighbourhoods, or areas of social and economic disadvantage. Therefore, insufficient or bad social regulations affect the process of economic development, and become a major reason to work on social development. In other words, trust, a certain degree of order, the stability of expectations, and the certainty of rules, are components of social regulations as much as the legal system, infrastructure, credit, enterprises, etc.

Without negating this fundamental assumption, the process of implementing such programmes has shown some limits. The social processes that impinge upon the social capital are fragile and demanding. To get them started, urban policies have to guarantee a resolute and uninterrupted approach that is rare. In other words, all too often programmes happen in a crowded context of competing and diverse initiatives, not all of them fostering the activation of social capital. Often in fact, spending programmes spark the interests of entrepreneurial networks at the margins of legality, which have the capacity to pressure the political system and civil opinions. Likewise, also in this case one can affirm that bad money drives out good.

The first problem, therefore, would be to eliminate the bad money or, even better, the unfair competition among public initiatives aimed at different targets. The second, more pernicious, regards all mobilization initiatives, and questions the process of the internal generation of social capital. And here lies the problem. Where the economy is weak, and illegal circuits are strong, ‘social capital’ is limited to service dominant positions, and is captured by limited circuits. This perverse form of social capital is embarrassing: it rewards a limited group, and excludes everyone on the outside; it aims to reward egoistic behaviour, and does not represent collective interests.

According to available historic reconstructions, Southern Italy’s history has been afflicted with a scarcity of universal and public social capital, while it has been characterized by an excess of particular capital, belonging to a small group opposed to the collective, which takes ownership of closed networks. A consequent issue would then be to promote the first and liberate the second, but this involves large political and cultural transformations, which a local programme probably cannot affect.

The response to the second question is connected to the first one. It is difficult to evaluate social capital in areas strongly penetrated by mafia organizations, because of the competition of criminal networks. Besides, the presence of criminal organizations erodes the standard supply of trust, which causes in turn disincentive for any virtuous behaviour, complying either with market or institutional rules. Often, these behaviours self-replicate and multiply, creating room for further deviant developments.

As a consequence, the absence of a specific assessment of urban policies (and of their various social, economic, and territorial outcomes) appears alarming connected with the control of the territory exercised by criminal organizations; as if it were not necessary to take specific precautions in promoting initiatives in areas marked by illegal economics. While, instead, the relevance of the real estate market and land-use is tantamount in mafia’s investments; as well as the delicate position of land-use developments in sparkling the interests of crime organizations either for ‘logistic’ purposes, or for money laundering.

A consequence of this observation is that reinforcing legality is a prerequisite of all actions of urban regeneration and development. However, legality is not consistent only with the introduction of normal, fair, and efficient rules, but also in the founding of simple and robust social regulation. Legality is a social practice, above and before a contract. It is constructed in the context made by social actors variously oriented, such as local decision makers, local policeman, civil servants and political parties, social actors and cultural or religious associations. In this broad sense, one can understand the already mentioned focus on the activation of social capital; both questions require a long term commitment to support local regeneration programmes (and not vice versa, as it happens now).

Finally, the answer for the third question is more general. The requirements of the integrated programmes have not been fully complied with in the implementation process in Italy (and presumably elsewhere). Rather, most of the programmes have often recorded many difficulties in integrating the initiatives. Integration does not mean only the concomitant realization of buildings, infrastructure and service operations, albeit desirable, nor only the balancing of various operations in a common strategic framework, a more difficult, yet preliminary requirement. These are all necessary, but not sufficient conditions, as they translate primarily in a model of inter-sector combination, nuanced according to various aims (functional, operative, partnership).

Another definition, perhaps closer to the original, intent of the integrated programme as a generative action, capable of producing new initiatives as well as accepting old ones; and as an action open to innovative actors (therefore, not only to the establishment), influenced by processes of participation and inclusion. Such initiatives have a double burden: they have to be implemented within constraints and deadlines dictated by exogenous, and non negotiable logics; at the same time, they have to connect such logics into a shared vision. Such a complex model insists on the dynamic control of the interdependencies between initiatives and subjects. Both models are highly demanding, more on the technical side the first case, more on the political the second one. Understandably, such requirements are not easily met by the implemented programmes.

In summary, the answers provided to the three questions cited before, suggest a possible critical contribution to regeneration programmes. Debating them would not only be timely, but necessary, in Italy as well as in Europe. In particular, a comparison is required between programme realization and results; and vice versa, the new issues of this historical moment should be addressed¹). However, it is necessary to pay a greater attention to the specific problems of the cities of Southern Italy.

From this point of view, the outcomes of this study – the first on Urban-Italia, and the first to investigate issues of development and legality in urban areas – offer a good starting point.

Some further comments can clarify the meaning to be drawn from this case-study. Urban Bagheria (as all the Urban Italia programmes) resembles the model implied by the Urban model less than expected; more precisely, it cannot pretend to be (only) an integrated programme. Comparing the Bagheria programme with the European Urban model, some differences strike one as obvious: the weight of infrastructure is predominant; the focus on economic and spatial development is limited; the initiatives fostering social cohesion are scarce, especially from a financial point of view.

But the problem is more general. The Italian ‘translation’ of the European Urban programme impinged upon building and infrastructure projects, rather than economic and social projects. One can doubt that this is the intended consequence of a political decision, rather than the interference of the Ministry for Infrastructure being the responsible of the programme; or the inexperience of the municipalities in managing initiatives that were not addressing building development. This element is certainly relevant, although not comforting.

Apart from these considerations, this report offers a deeper interpretation. The Urban programme of Bagheria was aimed at reconstructing elements of trust, and because of this it has privileged feasible yet incisive initiatives. About these, some features need to be remembered:

• the programme operated on the performances of the Public Administration (its transparency, and efficiency);

• it invested some exemplary dimensions, crucial to the local context, of the relationship between the public officers and citizens (land control, building subsidies etc.);

• it contributed to the repossession of public space, and parts of the cultural heritage (such as the Villas), not only for their economic value, but because they constitute symbolic moments in a bond of trust;

• finally, it contributed to the establishment and reinforcement of a few networks of conviviality and cultural exchange.

If accepted, this reconstruction may contribute to a wider evaluation of the outcomes of the programme.

The report illustrated the pragmatic meaning assumed by the programme, manifested in some significant outcomes among obvious and deep difficulties. Urban Bagheria demonstrates, in a case of relatively modest dimensions, the basic necessity to reconcile contradictory intentions: to favour visible works, but to commit to resolve grave problems; to address emerging problems, but to explore also those that are kept hidden; to restore transparency, and to simultaneously guarantee speed and efficiency of public investment; to give dignity to public officers contribution, while daily unraveling political quarrels…

In general, local public actions clash with ordinary issues of administrative work. In their relative simplicity, they seem semi-insurmountable when they have to be dealt with in urgent conditions, political weakness, and media exposure. Activities such as handling bids, propagating directives, organizing audits and surveillance, are all preliminary operations to programmes such as Urban, that these programmes obviously cannot control, and rarely influence. Their efficiency is not a specific problem, but it becomes a crucial factor within time constraints and efficiency of the entire programme.

The second remark, a bit more significant, indicates that European urban regeneration programmes, of which Urban Bagheria is also a part, are difficult to interpret unless their hybrid nature is recognised. Such hybridization is the result of the ‘neo-liberal inflection’ of the welfare state, which leads to relatively new local consequences. In other words, it would be useless to compare the programme with a full scale long-term public investment, as those implemented in post-war times, or to the de-regulative actions adopted in the ‘90s, when every initiative was apparently left to market forces.

Therefore, these programmes show the gradual mix of the two models, with some unpredictable combinations: the state maintains an important entrepreneurial role, and the public intervention builds the institutional foundations of the market; yet, public actions recognize the market, while searching to bend it to collective interests to counterbalance its narrow economic focus; from the social point of view, in short, providing opportunities for individuals has become a higher priority than fostering aggregated development.

There are two principal conclusions to this study.

The first is that the lack of effectiveness of the integrated programmes, as well as of other local regeneration initiatives, depends greatly on aggregated national conditions, and has to be dealt with at that level.

The second is that through these special programmes, exemplary ordinary investments have been realised, a little paradox that invites a reverse look. Upon the small bit of capital offered by these realisations, it may be possible to build some strategic local programme: it will be possible to intervene on the urban environment for the reduction of energy consumption and of pollution; for the improvement of the public transportation system. Il may also facilitate the social integration of immigrants, the extension of civil rights, the supply of social housing, for the development of cultural assets, resources, and tourist attractions, the improvement of labour capacities and, vice versa, the offer of advanced professional services. All these elements are largely influenced by the leadership put in motion by Urban, and if well adjusted, can contribute to the development and the competitive turn of the country.

Notes

1. The working Group activated thank to the collaboration between the Department of Urban studies, and the Urban Programme of Bagheria, has already produced some studies beside this report. See by M. Cremaschi, ed., Tracce di quartiere, il legame sociale nelle città che cambia, Milan, Angeli, 2008; “Limiti e prospettive dell’azione locale” (“Limits and Perspectives of Local Actions”), Territorio, 46, 2008, with contributions by Donzelot, De Leonardis, Tosi and Bricocoli; “Legalità debole, criminalità e periferie” (“Weak Legality, Criminality and the urban outskirts”), a section from a further issue of Territorio, with other contributions by Peraldi, Bagaglini, Sales.

Riferimenti bibliografici

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Cremaschi M. (2001a), Progetti di sviluppo del territorio: le azioni integrate locali in Italia e in Europa, Il Sole 24 ore

Comunicazione della Commissione al consiglio, al parlamento europeo, al comitato economico e sociale e al comitato delle regioni (2000), La programmazione dei Fondi Strutturali 2000-2006: prima valutazione dell’iniziativa Urban, parte seconda, http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/urban2/documents_it.htmt

Comunicazione della Commissione agli Stati Membri (2000), Orientamenti relativi all’iniziativa comunitaria concernente la rivitalizzazione economica e sociale delle città e delle zone adiacenti in crisi, per promuovere uno sviluppo urbano sostenibile Urban II, (2000)1100, 28/04/2000

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Palermo P. C., Savoldi P. (2002) (a cura di), Il programma Urban e l’innovazione delle politiche urbane. Esperienze locali: contesti, programmi, azioni, FrancoAngeli/Diap.

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Putnam R. (2004), Capitale sociale e individualismo. Crisi e rinascita della cultura civica in America, il Mulino, Bologna

Rullani E. (1994), “Il valore della conoscenza”, Economia e Politica Industriale, n. 82

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Trigiglia C. (1999), “Capitale sociale e sviluppo locale”, in Stato e mercato, n. 57, il Mulino, Bologna

Tripoli C. (2005), Dalla foresta al PRG del 1976. Crescita urbana di Bagheria, Eugenio Maria Falcone Editore

]]> http://cremaschi.dipsu.it/partnerships-strategie-e-governance-del-territorio/the-role-of-trust-and-social-regulation-in-the-integrated-programmes/feed/ 0 http://cremaschi.dipsu.it/papers-and-chapters-in-english/urban-policy-in-italy-not-so-absent-after-all/ http://cremaschi.dipsu.it/papers-and-chapters-in-english/urban-policy-in-italy-not-so-absent-after-all/#comments Fri, 23 Oct 2009 20:42:16 +0000 editore http://cremaschi.dipsu.it/?p=358 Takling urban policy in Europe, a first warning should regard the link between city and development, along with the discourse which has evolved around the theory of urban competitiveness. This condition is crucial, but not easy to bring about. Changes that involve the cities, especially in the [...]]]> “Politica urbana: un’assenza solo parziale, Urbanistica, 130, 2006, pp.12-19

Takling urban policy in Europe, a first warning should regard the link between city and development, along with the discourse which has evolved around the theory of urban competitiveness. This condition is crucial, but not easy to bring about. Changes that involve the cities, especially in the South, take place within an “urban hierarchy” which in Europe has remained stable since the eighteenth century, with very few exceptions.

Instead, the basic idea behind the policies is that the cities promote an accelerated and sudden development, of the kind that occurred in Los Angeles at the beginning of the twentieth century, when it became the capital of world cinema, or in the Silicon Valley around the end of the same century, when the computer industry gave rise to the new, mind-blowing technological agglomeration of the area.

The hope is that the technological production chain (cinema, computer, automation…) will couple with the agglomerative factors of the city (abundance of personnel, concentration of graduates, incentives for innovation….) and beget benefits for the entire surrounding region. It’s a daring bet; there have been extraordinary payoffs, but they have been rare.

The competitiveness aspect is fundamental for the cities, but has different meanings: on the one hand the cities are properly in competition in attracting foreign investments, which are rare and difficult to capture; on the other hand they have to offer conditions of efficiency to businesses so that they can be competitive. Well-administered cities produce more “intelligent” territories in relation to the challenge of globalisation. In this respect, competition, cohesion and sustainability are less at odds with one another than they might appear.

Scientific literature on this matter encompasses a vast and consolidated debate. From the 1970s on the cities of North America and Europe have gone through crises and transformations. The enormous loss of jobs in traditionally industrial cities led to a desperate search for recipes for economic development.

From the very start, the question of what exactly makes a city, or a territorial area, competitive appears very cloudy. The definitions derive from an extensive and well known literature, based on four theoretical cornerstones (Porter and Krugman, Storper and Kresl).

What we are interested in here is to provide a frame of the possible approaches – albeit schematic – , and the Italian urban and regional policies within such a scheme . Consequently, figure 1 illustrates four approaches (key characteristics and potential economic models) to territorial competitiveness. The horizontal axis shows the actions that promote competitiveness respectively in terms of expanded efficiency of the territorial system, or quality of life on the left, and of efficiency in the business environment, that is the comparative advantage of the enterprises, on the right.

The vertical axis shows a knowledge based economy (attracting leading businesses) on one side; and a diversified and “tertiary based” economy,developing from the status quo, on the other edge..

There are some important issues when economic theories are applied to urban and territorial policies. Assuming that the territories do compete with each other, the competition takes place in a different way from that of the companies. Individual factors (connectivity, capacity, quality of life, innovation) seem to matter differently in the theoretical approaches. Things change again when the scale considered goes from between national to regional, or even urban, because the mix of factors and the governance change as well.

Instead, in political rhetoric there is an almost universal tendency to claim that there is no contradiction between competitiveness and cohesion, governance and in certain cases sustainability. The result, within the academic sphere and in political discourses, is a sort of optimistic, yet somewhat upsetting, “New Conventional Wisdom” (Gordon and Buck, 2004), that easily conciliates discordant objectives. All this said, stating that urban policies are often “highly differentiated” (Cicciotti 2003) is not an irrelevant observation: on closer inspection, it means heterogeneous (and relatively predictable) on the one hand, and markedly context dependent on the other.

Instead, the European Commission appears to be convinced that certain politically crucial outcomes – growth, innovation and consensus – are specific to urban environments, and that urban initiatives can exert appreciable multiplying effects (albeit in the long term). This opinion is apparently shared by certain Member States (Odpm 2004; the “poles of competence” in Germany, the creation of “poles of territorial competitiveness” by DATAR, partially taken up by our own MIITT: 2005). From these references, and in particular from the work of the British government, we can identify five objectives’ families or “structural” actions, plus one rather particular final one. These are less general and more hybrid objectives than those defined by the theories on competitiveness, and are instead closer to practice.

The first family of objectives concerns actions that bring advantages to the system efficiency, focusing mainly on connectivity (infrastructures and tangible and intangible networks). Almost all the regions undertake such actions, with the intermodal and transnational activity being more relevant in Liguria and in the Adriatic regions (where the ports part of the cities). The diffusion of ICT and networks should sustain connectivity. So should the creation of city networks and other informal networks, while effectively the connection with markets and city networks is pursued through Fairs and territorial marketing rather than stable systems of relations.

As regards the second family of actions, the key to innovation lies in the human capital, and more specifically in a skilled workforce, and to a certain degree in the ability to interlink the demand and supply of skills, that is the knowledge transfer between universities, research, enterprises and institutions. At the moment, however, what prevails is training directed at the enterprises. Only in a few cases university centres present within the territory are supported, in an attempt to integrate these into the productive fabric. In the case of Sardinia, significant attention is focused on the training of human resources within local government and institutions, especially in the health sector.

The third family concerns innovation, which is stimulated – both in the institutions and in the enterprises – principally through incentives for the purchase of new equipment or the application of new technologies, followed by actions for the spread of IT. Proper innovation (new products, new technologies) is in certain cases stimulated through the direct funding of studies and research, and more often by attempting to stimulate the knowledge transfer between the universities (research centres) and the entrepreneurial fabric.

The fourth element of this list, the quality of life, emerges from the combination of factors related to environment, culture and housing. The southern regions have concentrated significant resources on the urban environment and on social policies, while in Objective 2 (partly because of restrictions on boundary definition) actions on the environment prevail.

Finally, the last and most elusive element is the strategic capacity to mobilise and implement long-term development strategies, frequently pursued in a fairly unsystematic manner. Effectively, there are very few investments for permanent structures on the territory in comparison to the temporary actions, for example for the duration of the tenders for access to funding, while structural transformations and competitiveness demand time.

The analysis of the theoretical literature on the one hand and the initiatives and policies on the other hand have affinities but no distinct correspondences. Certain options are more frequent in the policies, and others only vaguely translated into measures.

The analysis of the regional programming documents confirms this layout. In this analisys we felt it was appropriate to distinguish more clearly the role of the infrastructures, which are preponderant in more than one case.

Almost all the documents take up the Community directives, sometimes changing the investment amount percentages. The programming documents of the southern regions had a greater thematic scope, extended to the Centre-North in the 2000-2006 programming. The promotion of enterprises and development (integrated in the urban policies) is present throughout the South and the islands. The actions of urban regeneration reflect both the local requirements and the presence and interaction with other initiatives (Urban and funding linked to major events). The spatial target, that is the limitation of the actions to specific portions of the urban territory, is in some cases imposed by the programmes themselves, and in others reflects regional policy choices. The territorialisation of the urban initiatives is weak in half of the regional documents.

The investigation of the four regions (Piedmont, Veneto, Tuscany and Lazio) has further amplified the impression of a local framework of the urban cities which is at once complex and fragmented. In these four cases the urban models, composition and performance are not comparable, making a shared orientation framework fairly unlikely; even within the regions, the distinctive features of its urban network are not fully considered (in this regard, the recognition of Rome as capital that emerges on the part of Lazio is an exception).

Some sort of urban focus still emerges, effectively even more than what regulations or policy guidelines suggested, yet more often than not lacking a clear strategic framework. Again, it is not pure coincidence that these very regions are experimenting metropolitan master plans, with no particular connection to the SDP (to give just one example: the master plan of Turin only partially exploits the suburban policies, one of the most fertile intersections of Community programmes with local initiatives)

Over the last decade Italy has experienced the proliferation of numerous initiatives focused on the city and territory (the subject of a growing body of literature: see INU 2006).

A certain urban dimension in development policies is present in Italy, albeit in an implicit manner and frequently entrusted to local initiatives. Cities already appear to be doing without national and regional policies; but it is by no means to their absolute benefit, or to that of the regions or the State. Isolated development policies (at times even innovative) risk being occasional or redundant. Suffice it to say that Rome and Milan compete on airports, trade fairs and Olympics. This phenomenon regards capitals and the major cities, which also have the capacity to finance their investments. They sometimes even influence their Region, and are gaining statutes of increasing independence. Other cities and municipalities, non necessarily of modest status but with fewer resources, are less affected.

On the other hand, there are no particularly strong precedents of innovative urban programmes within regional or national programming. The Urban initiatives were successful, until they were transformed from ambitious social programmes into more traditional projects for urban regeneration. The principle of territorialisation of the ITP (Integrated Territorial Projects) or ILDP (Integrated Local Development Projects) was innovative, but it did not specifically concern the cities, and even then the programmes did not necessarily have a distinctive and innovative character. These programmes mobilised significant resources, both public and private, with clearly visible effects upon the territory.

In comparison to the last decade, not only do we have to admit that there has been an urban policy, but above all that certain concomitant elements have changed. The various programmes can be traced to three different families.

The first, more oriented towards housing and construction, albeit revised by the integrated approach, reveals a limited specific characterisation, except for the instrumental ends of regeneration, and a limited social orientation.

The second favours the district and integrated area actions, combining variously the Community and other inspirations, with a fair capacity for learning.

The third, with a clearly stated territorial background albeit of diverse origins and clearly more problematical (ITP and IDLP, implementation methods for the Community Support Framework 2000-2006 and the National Operational Plan 2000-06, urban Framework Programme Agreements), reveals vaster ambitions and an orientation towards capacity building and social inclusion.

A different approach, along with a more complete and complex strategic vision of the cities, emerges when observing the actions proposed at urban scale within complex programmes, and comparing them with the competitiveness factors. .

Looking back to figure 1, four different development scenarios can fit into the theorethical and action framework defined.

The main scenario, glorified by the rhetoric of the urban renaissance, is at the lower left corner . The policies of urban redevelopment, with the visible consequences in terms of gentrification, are almost universal. Basically, the core of urban initiatives meets the arch that represents policies in real estate development.

Nevertheless,some differentiation is peeking through. The initiatives that diverge from the above are not rare, especially in tertiary diversification (the promotion of new peripheral centralities). If accompanied by an increase in the efficiency of the entrepreneurial system, this entails a scenario with few changes in the urban fabric that may still attract investments.

In another direction, the combination of actions on the urban fabric and on the new economies leads more easily to a festivalisation of the cities, understood as sites for the “consumption” of culture, knowledge exchange and major events.

The last of the scenarios, linked to the perspective of knowledge cities, fosters a vision of technological development and advanced economies. These initiatives are still rare, especially if we move from words to action. But they are increasing in number and we can expect a significant growth in this sector.

In conclusion, we can say that the debate on competitiveness is very fertile, but tends to overrate theoretical aspects (for example the centrality of the site or the enterprise, or the tertiarisation in relation to the transition to a knowledge economy). In theory, given the institutional differences, the cities sustain the real estate market and the improvement of the physical context, while the regional and super-regional policies provide incentives to enterprise and target knowledge.

Instead, possibly not surprisingly, the policies implemented by the regions and cities are much more mixed than we would normally expect. The range is much wider, and some of the large cities are more active in enterprise and innovation policies than the small regions, and vice-versa. Cities and regions’ commitments cover multiple arenas, partly because of the legacy of the past, in the South; and partly for matters of consensus. There is no a single pure policy model; we rather ascertain various significant recurrences, summarised by the coloured area in the graph.

In the end, policies for urban regeneration, technological development or“festivalisation” (the new economy of the city of tourism and cultural innovation) are not alternative to each other. Rather, they generate one another. In such a set-up, promoting a policy scenario means reconstructing the evolution from one approach to another.

Despite the fact that many interventions within the cities were carried out through these programmes, it could be objected that the sum of the initiatives does not represent a unified policy (and here appraisals such as those laid out in the pages that follow dealing with four regions of the Centre-North prove useful). The same objection could also be valid for Urban, as for other programmes. However, it is important to emphasise that cities feature a major concentration of resources, projects and interventions; consequently, the urban dimension of development policies should be made more systematic on this basis, given the numerous examples and the accumulation of investments in quantitative terms.

It is, nevertheless, necessary to reflect seriously on the impact of an integrated vision of such initiatives. In this case too, the research points up the aspects which have had success and the deficiencies of the combinations of initiatives in the cities and in the regions examined, from which we can draw useful lessons for the policies to come.

In short, this study addresses the problems of integration between urban policies and innovation, modestly attempting to provide an answer. As always, the best indications are to be found not so much in ideological passwords, but in reflections that go beyond the everyday rhetoric, tackle the problem starting from a basis of critical knowledge, and define shared strategies.

]]> http://cremaschi.dipsu.it/papers-and-chapters-in-english/urban-policy-in-italy-not-so-absent-after-all/feed/ 0 http://cremaschi.dipsu.it/partnerships-strategie-e-governance-del-territorio/the-spatial-logic-of-european-actions/ http://cremaschi.dipsu.it/partnerships-strategie-e-governance-del-territorio/the-spatial-logic-of-european-actions/#comments Fri, 23 Oct 2009 20:35:37 +0000 editore http://cremaschi.dipsu.it/?p=355 Urban and Spatial European Policies: LEVELS OF TERRITORIAL GOVERNMENT, EURA Conference in Turin, 18-20 April 2002

The area based initiatives have become a common feature of urban policies in many countries of Europe; even more, the European Commission has located local actions and integrated programmes [...]]]>

Urban and Spatial European Policies: LEVELS OF TERRITORIAL GOVERNMENT, EURA Conference in Turin, 18-20 April 2002

The area based initiatives have become a common feature of urban policies in many countries of Europe; even more, the European Commission has located local actions and integrated programmes at the top of the framework of spatial policies.

The model of local action has sensible empirical reasons: it is an innovative model, which tries to overcome the weaknesses of sectoral public actions (Gaudin 1993). A few common features may possibly be detected: a) all the programmes are locally bound actions increasingly concerned with the local development and employment issues; b) they foster a “vision” of spatial development for the whole area, the idea of “territory” implying community, environment and the local heritage as well; c) intended initially as a group of detached measures, some have progressed toward compound social and economic features; d) dealing with the implementation process seems to trigger an embryo co-operation between local authorities and recently powerful regions.

The implementation of urban actions across Europe has pinpointed a number of policy assumptions:

• issues concentrated in distressed areas are all related and have to be tackled together in order to have a chance of renewing an area thoroughly (OECD 1998);

• operating on areas of limited extent guarantees greater visibility and more effective management in the implementation process (CEC 1995);

• different subjects combine in the local partnership (the inhabitants themselves, the local authorities, the national government, the private sector, voluntary bodies, and the European Union); such mix deeply influences case-studies in different studies, and is affected by national framework (Geddes 1998; Cremaschi 2002a);

• the “integrated” approach is meant as a technique able to trickle a cumulative process (Turok 1991);

• the effective management of such programmes has caused the local political-decisional system to progress, that is it has enabled it to gain a certain knowledge which spurs the system of governance to tackle and resolve on a permanent basis other social issues and problem areas (Chanan 1992);

• local actions excavate the ”capability deposit”, and allow the “local knowledge” to come to the surface, and the local network to experiment solutions which were not available or which did not appear available earlier.

Local action methodology has been recently extended to wider aims such as local development (De Rita and Bonomi 1998; Fundaçao 2001) and is now widely acknowledged as a fundamental tool of a new programming for a more sustainable development. The investments supported by the European Regional Fund in Italy are a good example (Gualini 2001): they also show that the identification of spatial concepts and the implementation of programmes influence each other, sometimes leading to a successful reconsidering of administrative boundaries and traditional spatial framework. According to the Community Support Framework for Italy, the “integrated projects” are a complex of inter-sectoral actions, nested in a coherent shared vision. Such actions require a unitary management and an adequate “critical weight” in term of financial investment (Bilancio 1999).

However, looking both at area initiatives and local development paves the way to a certain number of issues, as witnessed by the long establishment of the varied field of municipal strategies (Le Galès 1993). First of all, the sheer idea of a territorial basis of local action is questioned: on the contrary, this explains why the Urban initiatives stuck to a spatial concept such as the (rather French) idea of the “quartier”. As local development is concerned, not a single idea of a meaningful spatial concept can be ascertained, but rather a wide variety of territorial phenomenology (Cremaschi 2001).

It is for this reason that it seems worth questioning the “spatial logic” of the European integrated actions. Reconstructing the spatial logic means to address issues such as how local actions are influenced by the spatial organisation of societies; and, in contrast, how spatial images influence urban policies. These questions are worth further investigation. The reason is that a clear spatial approach has never been made explicit (CEC 1998c), and possibly is not among the priority of the European policy making (as witnessed by the complex history of the Spatial Perspective (Cremaschi 2002b; Faludi and Zonneveld eds. 1997).

This paper is based on a survey of different Italian development programmes (Rap100- Formez, 2001), and a comparison with different European urban policies (Cremaschi 2002a). The results are described elsewhere (Cremaschi 2001 and 2002b), while a few general remarks are presented here.

A first issue in the search of a spatial logic is the number of local actions, whose growing figure is somehow alarming (§1); a second issue is the vague and uncertain idea of what an adequate spatial concept should be, the spatial matching of territory and society being a hard theoretical issue (§2); a further issue is whether the model of integration fits in different spatial frameworks (§3); and finally, the last issue impinges upon the theoretical assumptions underlying the local action and the local development models (§4).

The inflation of urban actions

About 1,600 local actions have been running in Italy in less than five years, of different dimension and scope. Surveys show actions piling up within the same spatial units and administrative boundaries, promising a huge investment of public resources (about 78 billions €: Cremaschi M., 2000a, Censis 2001).

More precisely, two main strands seem in one way or another to have been brought together:

• the agreements devised by “Patti territoriali” in the framework of the national “negotiated” programming fostering local development, later assumed by the EU as Pacts for employment. These partnerships operate at the crossroads between job creation, enterprise creation and local development. Development actions consist of more or less 300 programmes, by two thirds located in the Southern regions;

• the mix of different functional actions fostered by programmes for the renewal of urban downgraded areas, yet often expanding to wider aims.

Subsequent “generations” of such programmes have in fact elaborated upon the same integrated approach, whose last offspring are the Sustainable Development Schemes (Prusst, Programmi di recupero urbano e sviluppo sostenibile del territorio: Lavori Pubblici 2000b) on the one hand, and the Local actions for spatial development (Pit, Programmi integrati territoriali: Cremaschi 2001), the “strategic vision” aimed to amalgamate locally the actions envisaged by the Community Support Framework, on the other.

Thus several programmes have fostered a variety of aims maintaining the same approach and moreover spreading actions over the same area. Probably because of these two reasons, the “family groups” were brought together and mingled.

Further steps may be represented by the spreading of Agendas, the environmental Agenda 21 or the Habitat agenda, inspired by international models fostered by the United Nations and by less formal international networks. The agendas seem consistent with these former integrated programmes for two main reasons: they focus on the consensus building side of the implementation of “shared” vision; and they imply a cultural effort to adequate or change the stakeholders’ orientations. Both are common issues of local actions (agendas have started to be institutionalised in some countries of Europe, for instance in Denmark).

The number of actions does matter. An inflated style of programming raises a double issue: an excess of technicalities in the targeting of areas; a lack of capacity by agencies to gradually adjust to areas and actions.

Elsewhere the new style of programming is becoming tricky due to either the number of single actions, or the small size of most of them. In France, the “politique de la ville” (Chaline 1997) alone accounts for more than 2.500 actions: it has progressively summed up 214 “contrats” with different cities and metropolitan areas plus Paris, all together addressing 1300 neighbourhoods and 750 municipalities. As a consequence, it may be impossible to make out the whole picture, and the resulting jigsaw seems in any case to lack the due “democratic accountability”(Sueur 1999).

In Germany (Toepel et al., 2000) national urban programmes stem from the municipal experimentation of local initiatives (Gualini 2000): the Soziale Stadt programme concerned 162 initiatives in 124 cities in 1999.

In the UK the number of local initiatives has not simplified the elaboration of unitary development strategies, but has made it harder (Social Exclusion Unit, 2000: 29), while the severed style of the management weighs as a “burden” on the local operators.

The inflating of local actions questions the adequateness and pertinence of area based initiatives. However, the logic of spatial effects is somehow vague while the excess of boundaries enhances a new technicality of spatial practices. The murky sediment of multi-layered programmes increases the gap between general policies and local actions.

Ad-hoc territories

Beyond number and variety, the spatial effects of single actions are highly differentiated. However the logic of spatial effects is sometimes vague.

Often the combined result of different “territorial concepts” is unclear. Integrated programmes -such as the Urban Initiative- have combined several territorial concepts: the functional zoning of areas (in order to delimit areas eligible for financial support and to determine the application of territorialized policies): the improvement of basic infrastructures, facilities and public services; the development of synergies to establish functional interdependencies among policies; the differentiation of policies, measures and technical assistance on the basis of specific territorial criteria (CEC 1998b). Even more so when local development, or wider programmes, are at stake.

The Italian agreements for local development (Rap-Formez 2001) impinge upon different territorial images.

Research has shown (tab. 1) that spatial concepts and policy styles are closely linked. However, combined outcomes occurred sometimes that are coherent with the decision process implemented:

1. some regions have referred to homogeneous territorial areas, such as those often described in the framework of regional planning; the decision if often hierarchical, yet is sometimes corrected by a mild reference to economic processes;

2. other regions refer to the local economic systems, more ambitious local identities which ideally coincide with an employment basin and a development process, defining ad hoc areas incrementally resulting sometimes from a negotiated selection, sometimes from a top-down decision;

3. finally, some regions have designed project-areas, as opposed to the natural ones, combining factual indicators, administrative criteria and local “visions” derived from a wide negotiation with local stakeholders and policy-makers, thus mediating between the “hardware” of different localities and the “software” of articulated processes.

Tab. 1

Spatial concepts and policy styles

However, it can be easily recognised that:

1. often, localities involved are highly heterogeneous (both for geographical features and for development perspective);

2. not surprisingly, territorial images differ; among the images, those resulting from a “voluntarist projection”, being presumably more interesting then than those mirroring geographical features only;

3. the matching of localities and images is the outcome of a sense-making process among stakeholders, as well as of an opportunistic stance of the local decision-makers (Cersosimo 2000);

4. and finally, the construction of areas depends on the regional policy framework (Cremaschi 2001b).

Beyond a reasonable amount the following features tend to be problematic and to hide any coherent spatial effect: number, territorial heterogeneity, variety of styles. However, it is seems interesting to ascertain whether they affect also the model of local action too.

Integration models

A further question is whether integrated programmes follow a unitary model. This is to question one of the most important features of the new urban actions, and precisely the core idea of the integration of measures. One can conclude that integration is not only a tantalising concept, but also quite a multifaceted one, which addresses the rather complicating issue of matching spatial concepts and spatial policies.

Notwithstanding the Commission support for an extensive idea of integration, “…integrated approaches are still relatively few” (CEC 1998b). The idea of integration is however a “plural” one, not easily identifiable.

It must be noted that, on one hand, programmes seldom went further than a shallow blend of functional measures, and did not overcome what may be called the functional limit of integration. So far, the Italian experience enacted a weaker version of integration. Integration has been often meant as a sheer mix or balance of different measures, sometimes with disappointing outcomes (Tosi in Lavori Pubblici 2000): building, infrastructure, some social benefits and services to employment. However, different interpretations of the integration concept can be ascertained in territorial practices (Padovani 1999; Cremaschi 2002a; Donolo 2001).

On the other hand, it should be reminded that pursuing integration is not a recent one. There is no doubt that development projects of the ‘50s for instance were mainly a one-sector, one-actor mix of actions. International agencies insisted on concentrating on a single activity providing supposedly beneficial one-sided shocks to the entire economy.

However, a more integrated approach did sometimes crop up in the framework of the national economic development programme for the South; for instance, some integrated actions tried out after World War II targeted housing, health and education, strongly influenced by a peculiar mixture of Italian historicism and US regionalism. As geographical patterns are formed by history, the matching up of society and the environment moulded the whole territory. In turn, such ideology maintained that its structural features offered a basis for a comprehensive strategy of spatial development.

A second strand may be traced back to the 70s, to the growing awareness that regional spatial frameworks were affecting the outcome of the economic measures taken for the development of the South. To replace the budgetary style of programming, a complex of incentives and local agreement procedures were devised, tools to be generalised later in the 90s. However, those first attempts did not overcome the functional limit already shown. Since then, a turn in strategy fostered a more negotiated approach and a strengthened effectiveness.

It is worth remembering the definition provided by the European Commission, in the context of a review of the territorial implications of EU policies:

“More ambitious than the simple acknowledgement of functional interactions and the development of the synergies which can result, certain Community activities try to develop integrated and multisectoral approaches with a strong territorial dimension… (These initiatives) – based on the principles of participation and partnership – are aiming at the joint identification of a common strategic vision of development through effective co-ordination and co-operation between all the actors involved … and by taking into consideration both the natural, economic, social and territorial potential of an area and its hinterlands as well as the limits of its carrying capacity… (CEC 1998b: Italics added).

In the Commission language, the integrated approach is one among “a plurality of territorial concepts” of a very different nature, and among such concept it is an intriguing one, not easily matching EU aims and options. More precisely, the integrated approach may be distinguished from policies presenting direct impacts (such as the delimitation of areas eligible for support, the improvement of basic infrastructures, the differentiation on the basis of specific territorial criteria, etc.) which implement the basic functions of the Regional Policy.

The integrated approach instead is a concept linking three rather difficult presumptions: an underlying strategic vision, an agreed action plan, and a commitment to sustainability.

There are quite obvious differences with the outcomes of previous less integrated programmes like those discussed so far: the integration model enacted by most of the initiatives reviewed is limited to “ the simple acknowledgement of functional interactions”. Even the ambitious Development Plan of the South (Bilancio 1999) is aimed to concentrate the financial resources on a limited number of measures and areas; and the regeneration programmes implemented so far have privileged the financial integration and rather the cross-linkage of private developments with social aims and public actor (Dicoter 2000).

However, the functional interaction is basically a technical combination, and does not imply –at least to a significant extent – a joint conceptualisation.

Networks or communities?

The final remark concerns the model of development fostered by the programmes.

Again, certain vagueness and redundancy have been found in most of the strategic statements, at least at an initial stage. Due to the competition requirements, an agreement between the strategic vision and the action plan is not always guaranteed. It is worth remembering that territorial policy lacks a strong background in Italy, apart from a few examples such as the land reclamation and some early Fifties programme in the framework of post-war effort to develop the Southern regions. And it is also worth remembering that the municipal level is the stronger tier of territorial government, as elsewhere in Europe, while the integrated spatial development is weak either at a regional or at a national level. However, this is a changing feature of the planning system in most European countries (Cremaschi 2002c), and even in Italy a form of structure plan is now provided by the provincial governments (Lavori Pubblici 2000)

Even more important, action plans have varied quite a lot in the implementation process, being strongly influenced by the empirical conditions of the assembling (Avarello 2001). This is a coercive condition in the most deprived situations: due to a potential unlimited requirement of infrastructure, employment initiatives, public service etc., no one action plan can possibly satisfy local needs entirely. Consequently, the implementation game continuously offers endless reasons to rework the initial statements. It is these reasons that multi-layered political processes – such those characterising southern Italy- are eager to spoil.

And finally, the image of the territory implied by the vision of the economic development is rather weak. Other integrated programmes have cared more about the matching of the spatial representation, and of the model of action. As local development is concerned, the first is often ritual and not relevant, as experienced so far by the Community Framework. Consequently the “agreed” vision tends to be weak, and the territorial criteria less coherent. The local development programme lacks an identification of the social core of the spatial unit, as effective as the idea of neighbourhood in the urban policy. Decades ago the idea of community could have played such a role, an idea is sometimes advocated by influent thinkers of the autonomy of “local societies” (Magnaghi 2000, De Rita e Bonomi 1998).

Actually, both the neighbourhood and the community ideas hide similar conceptual and political “traps” (Bagnasco 1999), against which territorial and urban policies are not likely to have been inoculated yet. One of the original characters of the integrated programmes is rather the peculiar link between general issues –such as social exclusion or economic development- and the local action. From this point of view the idea of a “locality” is like of that a cosmopolitan network which exploits the “hidden resources” of the locality, joining local and global knowledge (Hannerz in Perulli 2000, p. 46).

Community however is not the only source of stimulus for local development initiatives. Recently, the idea of local society as a complex web of relations has been re-introduced even in the core of economic science. In the spirit of the integrated programmes, as described in the last paragraph, it is maintained that territorial criteria influence economic development and social equitableness. Even more so, the economic relevance of localities is acknowledged by regional policies inspired by the (mainly Krugman’s) theory of global competition (for the Italian case, see a review in: Barca and Pellegrini 2000).

It is quite clear that the integrated action for local development impinge upon a shared theoretical hypothesis (already included in manuals: Musu e Cazzavillan 1997): “localities” rest upon a hidden potential. The local project resorts to social capital in order to exploit such unmobile and often unknown resources.

On the other hand, the survey of local development practices offers far more mixed results. Local actions have sometimes led to unintelligible outcomes, an issue that questions the adequacy of local actions to match policy aims. It is an important question, yet one that cannot be met purely on theoretical grounds.

Eventually, the ideal-type of spatial concept underlying the local development initiative is characterised by three features: the spatial voluntarism, the idea of spoiling the sediment of “hidden resources”, in a strategic framework mixed up with collusive and opportunistic attitudes.

Conclusions

A few common features of most European actions have been detected in the survey of the earlier attempts of Southern Italian programmes. In practice, the survey has shown several weaknesses, those included the number and variety of local actions, a highly nuanced model of integration; a weak theoretical basis. The spreading and success of actions in front of an apparent unsymmetry between the rationale and the action-plan of the programmes is particularly striking.

However, some issues seem more general as shown by the comparison with foreign examples. The European integrated actions -when addressing the issue of local development- need an adequate conceptualisation both of the local society and of the development model. Other integrated programmes –for instance, in the field of urban policy – have cared more about matching the representation and the model of action (Turok 1991), the ideas of “quartiers” and of community acting somehow as paradigms.

In conclusion, the spatial logic of European actions seems an effect rather than a deliberation. It appears, however, blurred along the stratified boundaries of different programmes and justified on somehow fragile theoretical basis. Yet it results of increasing political importance, because of the spatial management of differences in an enlarged Europe (Cremaschi 2002b). A few broad issues question the expansion of area-based initiatives.

The first is the adequacy of a partnership and participatory model to enact a sustainable development process in less developed regions: such integrated programme for local development targets the most difficult aim, in the most difficult environment. This is a general issue that requires careful attention in the balance of policy initiatives, particularly at the European level and in the process of enlargement of the Union, a concern already expressed with regard to the urban policy area (Cremaschi 2002b).

A second major weakness is about the description of the territory. When the spatial concept of local society is ritual and not relevant, as possibly with the “local development agreements” (yet the new programming in Italy is far from reaching evaluable outcomes), the “agreed” vision tends to be weak, and the territorial criteria less coherent. It is worth to considering whether regional planning and economic analysis have been able to introduce yielding and productive territorial images.

A further issue arises from the superimposing of programmes. If new programmes join a number of others targeting the same area -or neighbouring areas- the issue arises of co-ordinating such actions. On the one hand, a spatial development framework is needed to direct local actions (an issue more and more at stake of the European planning reform: Cremaschi 2002b); on the other, an “agreed vision” is required in order to underpin the framework. As known, these double requirements are anything but easy to uphold. In particular, difficulties are apparent when and where local authorities are weak, which is likely to happen for instance in Southern regions.

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Social practices are open to a twin analytical understanding, according to the double meaning of social links to which they contribute: either they are an expression of the different forms of sociability, and thus they can be presented as [...]]]> International Housing Conference, Housing in Southern Europe, a separate path?, Madrid, 2-4 dec. 1998

Social practices are open to a twin analytical understanding, according to the double meaning of social links to which they contribute: either they are an expression of the different forms of sociability, and thus they can be presented as the manifestation of cultural identities, sometimes then as the residual evidence of pre-modern world; or they are indicators of the integration, or at the opposite of the deterioration, of social links, therefore playing a far deeper structural role.

These are just analytical distinctions, since cultural identity is part of the process of social integration, while being both linked in a circular way. A systematic consideration of housing practices led to underline a few significant features, which will later bee commented on with reference to some examples:

• housing practices can be interpreted only by referring to the extended image of the networks in which they are developed. Family and kinship networks are particularly important, and researchers have shown that this is equally true even in modern and advanced society; however, local or community linkages influence practices as well, where different networks of sociability (¹) frequently overlap and mix up with market and professional relations. This image sheds a light on a highly complex web of inter-relationship which are particularly manifest and have been made apparent in informal processes and smaller communities; yet, it is not exclusively dependent on size and proximity, and can actually be traced down even in more complex living systems;

• exchanges of resources and symbolic exchanges play at least an equally important role, especially in the informal processes intended to home-ownership, where kinship and solidarity are directly involved; however, what does this account really undermine, is the well established image of the household as a individualistic consumer, a “rational” subject of economic choices, integrating different resources in a optimised budget, and maximising individual benefits from a range of interchangeable alternatives.

• housing practices, as part of a non-formal world of exchanges (as those what are usually intended to with reference to the reciprocity domain), have been maintained to be residual in the oversimplified view of the modernisation process; yet the transition to a post industrial society, enhance the possibility to take in account plural configurations of housing rationalities, some of them having been made clear by informal processes. However, at the stand is not only the willingness to recognise equal rights to social practices compared to formal and market processes. More ambitiously it has been stated that ”space practices plot against the determining conditions of social life” (de Certeau 1980), at the very moment that “urban rationality” fails to ensure the threefold promise to unify spare urban and social fabrics in a strategic, abstract and universal body. Thus, practices are not embedded in space, but create their own reference space.

In this paper I limit myself to suggest that late housing practices can be examined from two points of view, while presenting in the next paragraphs some empirical supports with reference to the last years. The first point of view highlights the steady increase of dwelling consumption; and stresses the tendency to “make space” at home for a larger set of relationship, many related with family networks. The second highlights the progressive overlapping of issues concerning the dwelling with issues concerning the surroundings and pinpoints –somehow contradictorily- the “escape attempts” from the same configuration towards an “outer” space, sometimes just a dreamed one, where a different balance is aimed between the dwelling of the family and the frame of social relations.

1. Tenures

Home-ownership rate is high since years (68% in 1997, about 13 million households) and, even quite different among different areas, for instance in cities and in North, tend to homogenise. Ownership is highly correlated with income, which are commonly studied by proxies such as jobs and education. No surprise that the better off tend to be owners at a rate higher than the average (in 1991 19.1% of the entrepreneurs and the professionals rented their homes; the same rate was 15% in 1996).

However, it is interesting to say that ownership rate does not ever show a clear-cut class difference. Even if blue-collar workers are twice as likely to be in the rented sector than entrepreneurs (30.7, almost the same than five years before: 1991, 32,1), they are quite well represented among the owners as well. In fact, owners among blue collars are now 69.3%, with a significant increase compared to the post war period. Still, in 1971 and 1978 industrial blue collar workers were likely to be owner at a rate respectively of 42 and 44%.

The rented stock was more than half of the total after World War II: since then it has been halved, and it is steadily decreasing now, even if at a lower pace. In fact, the rate of rented dwellings has sharply declined during the last quarter of this century and, in particular, during the Eighties. Its size is estimated approximately at 23% of the housing stock, i.e. more or less 4.8 million dwellings. Renting is higher in metropolitan areas (60% in metropolitan cores; 66.7% in metropolitan belts), especially in southern ones.

However, the decline of the rented sector has benefited not only ownership but even alternative forms of tenure, mainly not for profit ones, which now accounts for almost 10% (more than 2 millions households) of the total stock. Such tenure forms were considered residual, but they have recovered since the collapse of renting occurred (life-tenancy 2.2; rent-free 5.8; other 0.9). It is interesting to pinpoint that people in such forms of tenure are rather poor (72% is below the average income: Cnel 1996).

Tab. 1 Rented dwellings in metropolitan areas per macro-regions

Metropolitan areas Total

Core belts

North West 36.5 34.0 26.8

North East 37.9 13.5 19.4

Centre 35.3 15.1 23.7

South 46.7 30.1 22.7

Islands 44.0 21.3 21.9

(Istat 1996)

Tab. 2 Rented sector

Private Building Social

Rental Society rental

North 68.3 8.1 23.6

Centre 59.1 9.7 31.2

South 71.5 3.4 25.1

Cities with > 50.000 inhab. 60.2 8.6 31.2

Other municipalities 75.2 5.2 19.6

Total 67.6 6.9 25.5

Source: Istat, Household Consumption 1995

Tab. 3 Dwelling stock in the Milan area according to tenure

1981 1991

owner-occupied 44,3 62,3

subsidised dw. with right of redemption 2.4 -

private rental 30,3 17,6

building society rental 7,5 5,6

social rental 8,2 8,2

rent-free, life-tenancy, etc. - 2,5

other 7,1 3,8

Total 100,0 00,0

Source: Elaboration on Instat, Censimento 1991e 1981

Rent is negatively correlated with income: the rent paid by the three lower deciles on the income ladder is about 25-35% of the total earnings, against a 10-13% in the three upper deciles (Cnel 1997). Rent is even higher in big cities: in Milan, rent is close to one third of income for at least one out four of the households in the rented sector (Pim 1998).

General cost for a dwelling (average rent or mortgage plus heating) is over 31% of the monthly household budget (²), a rate that reaches its peak for the older single households (>65: 45.5%), that usually live in the inner cities. Dwelling cost is more affordable for the extended families (more than three children: 26.3%) living in the outskirts of metropolitan areas. Moreover, it has been shown that average income of tenant household has diminished from 83% to 79% compared to the owners’ income in the first half of the 90s (Cnel 1997).

And finally, social rented sector is traditionally limited in Italy, even compared to Italian standards. According an estimation based on the income threshold, about 2.7 million households were entitled to a social dwelling, while social rented stock amount to 1.1 million approximately (Aniacap 1993).

The crux in the change in tenure –increase of home-ownership, reduction in the private rental sector- is the tendency toward a rigid market structure, one that seemingly contrasts with the more flexible demand that has grown in the last years. Ownership used in fact to be a far more rigid status than renting, because of higher cost of transactions, taxes, etc. Forcing people to the purchase of a dwelling influences the localisation patterns as well, since it tends to lower the appeal of the urban condition.

2. Mobility

In the 2^nd post war era residential mobility coincided for a long time with migratory movements. At the end of the 70s, however, a dramatic rise in market rent level accompanied by a shortage in most of the metropolitan areas exerted a strong pressure onto households to move. That period coincided in fact with a considerable effort paid mostly by blue- collar families in order to purchase a flat; and a systematic decline in the rented sector, in particular in the percentage of dwellings let by private owner. In fact, the overwhelming privately rented sector still accounts for two thirds of all the rental stock. However, it has been considerably reduced since the war, and mostly in big cities; for instance, in the Milan area it has diminished from 30% of the total dwelling stock to 18% between 1981 and 1991.

A part from this phenomena, residential mobility is usually meant as limited in Italy and however highly dependent from institutional and transactional constraints. Residential mobility in big cities has been estimated at the end of the 80s between 4,6% and 6,6% per year (Bellicini 1988). However, the number of purchase have increased since 1985 by about 20%, yet fluctuating around 500 thousands notwithstanding the strong increase in the households number and in the estimates of the “potential” demand (Censis 1997). The number of lease is instead on the increase (+57%), but it should be reminded the widespread habit of informal and often illegal forms of leasing in the rental sector (Cnel 1997). However, in the 90s the reduction of in costs both of dwellings and mortgages has likely stimulated an increase of mobility.

The last Istat Survey (Istat 1998) estimated that about 900.000 householders in 1996 have moved (4.4%) with a slight increase compared to the previous years: since 1993, 3.9-4,0% of householders moved per year (i.e. 812.000 householders). However, the trend is steady on the increase: the same source estimated that approximately 3% of the overall householders changed homes per year between 1984-88 (Istat 1993). In 1996 householders in the Northern regions and the metropolitan belts were at the origin of a large share of residential movements. Householders in the core of metropolitan areas –which are older and among the better off- were instead less eager to move than the average, even if their mobility appears to be on the increase (1993: 2.7, 1996: 3.7).

Reasons to move are mainly two: de-cohabitation (roughly for one third: getting married or equivalent 27.2%; living alone 6.5%; living with other people 2.7%); and becoming a owner (14.5%), both however slightly declining. Other reasons are getting a larger dwelling (10.3%) (³) and a better accommodation or environment (9%).

The Survey also asked whether people have just considered the option to move in the previous 12 months: the share of a desired move was higher than the actual mobility, about 7.7%, but a decreasing one (it was 8.0% in 1993).

Intentions to move have different justifications than actual decisions: the answers were mainly the search for better living (25.4%) or a larger dwelling (23.7), while de-cohabitation was expected by a narrower group (roughly for one fourth: getting married or equivalent 11.2%; living alone 7.6%; living with other people 4.2%). Answers like getting closer to the job (8.3) or becoming a owner (9.0) have declining shares compared to 1993.

In the long term, intentions to move seem to have changed even more. Expectations to move in a two-year term were significantly high (20%) in 1978, when a severe shortage occurred in urban areas while prices went up causing the worst “housing crisis” since decades. Twenty years ago, however, weddings was the single most answered item (24%), followed by getting closer to jobs (19%), the purchase of a home (14%), and finally the search for a better accommodation (13%).

3. Satisfaction

The area of subjective dissatisfaction with dwelling has consistently reduced, as is possible to show comparing answers given to the Household Consumption survey in different years.

Besides, a national Censis Survey (a private research body) reported in 1997 that dissatisfaction was limited to the 10,8% of the total (while it accounted for a larger share in metropolitan areas: 12,7%). In 1993, the regional Social Survey in the Milan region of Lombardy showed that less than 6% of the answers were negative. The only issue that does not clearly improve is the affordability of rent. Notwithstanding a small variance, findings are quite clearly converging, at least with reference to judgements concerning the dwelling.

That is not the same with dissatisfaction with the surrounding urban environment (19%; 21,3% in big cities: Censis 1997). In fact, a term that frequently crops up in reference to the outskirts environment is “disagio urbano” or ”disagio diffuso” (a term which has not immediate equivalent in English, maybe “widespread housing stress” or “urban environment stress”), that can be equated with the entire area of poor quality housing.

Urban stress derives from different and somehow vague ingredients (Cremaschi 1994b). Traffic congestion is now perceived as a problem by 74% of urban dwellers, as well as poor public transportation (38% of workers spend more than hour in their daily journey to job), crime (63% of urban dwellers has the feeling of being at risk), poor social life, etc. However widespread, urban stress affects more peripheral areas and the urban poors, which are more likely to concentrate there.

However, it is worth stressing that dissatisfaction with dwelling is always less underlined that dissatisfaction with single items, such as heating or dimension which have been not adequate for a large share of the population until few years ago. One reason is possibly the historical housing need and the severe uncertainty about the future that sweeten the present condition.

tab. 4 Causes of Dissatisfaction with dwelling

1978* 1993 1996

Dimension 33 15 14

Inadequacies 25 8 6

Distance from relatives n.a. 19 17

Costs/affordability n.a. 53 54

% of rent higher than 20% of total earnings 27 - 39

* In 1978 questions were not strictly equivalent

Source: Consumption Survey

tab. 5 Causes of Dissatisfaction with neighbourhood

1978* 1993 1996

public transport 40 31 28

crimes 26⁴ 31 29

traffic 34 48 49

* In 1978 questions were not strictly equivalent

+ Estimation on Istat, Survey on Consumption;

tab. 6 Dissatisfaction: 1997, Censis Survey

Small medium large total

Centres cities cities

dwelling 7.7 9.1 12.7 10.8

surroundings 16.0 14.7 21.3 19.0

Tab. 7 Satisfaction and Dissatisfaction in 1977 National Survey

People satisfied: dissatisfied:

highly enough rather very

dwelling 16 59 19 6

heating 17 42 27 14

large fair small very small

dimension 7 60 19 14

People satisfied: dissatisfied:

highly enough rather very

neighbourhood 18 62 16 4

building quality 28 39 25 8

streets and pavements 26 43 21 10

public transport 15 45 23 17

tab. 8 Satisfaction and Dissatisfaction: 1993, Milan, Irer Survey

highly enough rather very

satisfied satisfied dissatisfied dissatisfied

Dwelling 47,4 47,1 4,8 0,7

I feel well It happened I will leave

Surroundings (“dwelling environment) 63,3 30,8 5,9

Tab. 9 Dissatisfaction with dwelling and neighbourhood per type of family in the Milan area

Dwelling Surroundings

Occupied Single 2,4 16,2

Workers with partner unemployed 10,0 15,0

One parent Household 7.7 12,5

Double income with children 8.3 8,8

Retired old single 12.5 -

Double income 6.5 6,3

Retired with children - 5,6

Other 4.4 3,2

Total 5.5 5,9

Fonte: Regione Lombardia, Irer: Social Survey 1993

4. Making space: living around a dwelling

The “state of the art” living in Italy tends to be in a flat in a multi-dwelling building (54%). However, single-family house (30%) and two-family house (13.7%) account for a large share of total dwellings. Apparently, the overwhelming preference has been expressed for medium size, multi-dwelling buildings, that are in fact the most widespread urban dwelling typology. In fact, as far as the economic trends promoted urban growth, the desire for a single house was a sort of “wishful thinking”.

Eventual preference for one model or another are highly structured both by structural conditions and economic preference. We should quote at least that historically urban elite have led the country; that most of small urban cities are quite liveable and vibrant; and that building promoters have been ever-practising the art of multi-storey building, with a seemingly rigid brick and stone technology which actually allowed a great flexibility and adaptability. For instance, in Lombardy (the region around Milan characterised by a highly industrialised and a highly urbanised environment) more than 76% of the dwelling stock (Irer 1996) is in multi-dwelling buildings, 40% of them in the top tallest class, while single family or semi-detached houses are rather infrequent (24%). Of course multi-dwelling buildings are mostly in the metropolitan area (more than 90%), whereas single family or semi detached houses are more frequent respectively in small villages or in the metropolitan suburbs (⁵).

However, a growing dissatisfaction with high-rise accommodations is commonly detected. Even the scant housing research devoted to this subject has easily highlighted the fact that the majority of those interviewed preferred anything but high-rise, for reasons like: inadequacy of space, lacking amenities, social isolation, etc. (Censis 1983). The problem of satisfaction or of dissatisfaction seems to be linked to the maintenance of buildings and to technological and social problems rather than to the high rise itself. In particular, high rise estates as part of metropolitan peripheral belts are deeply concerned in the process of downgrading of the environmental quality: nuisance, pollution, traffic congestion, etc. A polarisation process is then taking place, differentiating a few number of “problem areas” from the less dramatic but nevertheless unsatisfactory condition of peripheral estates.

Where strong informal production took place (see the survey for the municipality of Rome: Censis 1989), the preference for the “case di borgata” (i. e. the informal neighbourhood dwelling unit, not necessarily a single family detached house) was clearly declared by 57% of the respondents, the preference being required and expressed, in this case, towards a specific urban environment rather to a dwelling typology.

A survey has tried to compare present and desired dwelling conditions, showing that satisfaction with high-rise was relatively low, and the most desired accommodation was in a small building with 4 or less flats (Censis 1983). Also surveys on the image of the “dream house” reported that some youngsters’ desire was a house with a garden but (… ) located in the middle of the town”. The more realistic ambition of most of the interviewed was a flat “…with a view” (that could be easily imagined either on a beautiful landscape or on the roofs of the historical central district) in a multi-dwelling building in the same neighbourhood where they were used to living (Gazzola, 1990).

Another example can be the double belonging to different world, an experience allowed by second houses. Italy’s 5.2 millions of non-occupied dwellings (⁶) (as much as 5 times the amount registered in 1961) testify that a huge effort has been spent by household in order to duplicate their own model of living. Actually, almost half of the unoccupied stock is utilised as holiday houses or for tourism and summer rent; a further 20% is actually occupied, even if in a non permanent way, by people studying or working in other cities than their usual abode.

That is to invalidate the usual explanation that socio-cultural traditions explain the difference in the dwelling habits, uses and modes of consumption among countries. It has been stated that “the preference for one’s own house can be seen as expressing a more individualistic lifestyle… leading people to separate themselves from their kin as well as from their neighbourhood” (Höllinger and Haller, 1990). However, the same argument could be sustained for high-rise buildings and metropolitan living, depending in part from groups life-styles and in part from the balance between distance, transportation and communication technologies. And in fact, different ways of living seem rather to mix up in distinct urban and non-urban frames. For instance, findings show that actually daily contacts with relatives are easier for single house dwellers (32%) than for the inhabitants of high rise housing (13%). However, dwellers in high rise accommodation live closer to friends (30%) than single-house dwellers (21%), showing (at least) a different distance factor in the two situations (Cremaschi 1997).

tab. 10 Dwellings per type of building

building type N. of buildings N. of dwellings % of dwellings

Total Houses 9.768,730 11,501,384 45.9

Single-family house 7,578,575 7,578,575 30.3

two-family house 1,732,655 3,465,309 13.7

Rural houses 457,500 457,500 1.8

Total Multi-dwelling 1,830,000 13,527,138 54.1

Total 11,598,730 25,028,522 100.0

source: estimation on Istat, 1991

5. Escape attempts: living elsewhere and changing home

As we have said, the point is that dissatisfaction with a dwelling typology is expressed as dissatisfaction with the urban condition. The preference, if any, for a single family house is than actually mixed up with a later negative evaluation of some features of the urban living, basically depending on environmental issues such as traffic or pollution. The choice of a dwelling model tends to enlarge towards the expression of a preference for an entire built environment, or even the refusal of cities tout-court: somehow, is a choice expressed by “foot”, moving outside the metropolitan areas.

This process tends to drain away the more affluent population from towns, often middle aged people. As a consequence, multi-storey buildings largely dominate the townscape; while countryside is often scattered with long arrays of houses.

The recent shift in urban trends, and the metropolitan decline of the ‘80s, has contributed to the sharp change in the forms of housing provision. Thus, a growing number of families have moved outside the metropolitan areas in search of better housing conditions, often promoting and financing their own houses directly; non-urban settlements accounted for 50% of overall housing completions during the 80s, against a rate of 20% in metropolitan areas. Images such as the “widespread city” and the “urbanised countryside” have in fact been introduced in order to describe new social links and a new configuration pattern in some highly industrialised and highly urbanised regions (for instance, in the central and north-eastern regions).

Such images try to conceptualise the difference between the new scattered landscape in the north-eastern regions; the old urban industrial landscape of north-western regions; and the rural and tourist Southern regions. Regional differences are in fact very sharp in Italy: for instance, the rate of single family houses is 30% and the rate of urbanisation is close to 34% in the North-East; is 17% the former and 46% the latter in North West; while single houses accounts up to 40% in the basically rural South. The rate of single double family houses varies as well from 7,7% in cities to 40% in non urban municipalities. High rise distribution highlights an even more polarised view: five main cities (Rome, Milan, Turin, Naples and Palermo) show a rate of high-rise buildings over 30%, mostly in Rome and Milan (where is worth to note that high rise housing built before World War II is respectively 19% and 23%).

Padovani reported for the Milan metropolitan area “a situation of high housing mobility within the metropolitan area” (Padovani 1995), whilst mobility had a dominant regional pattern in the previous decades. This pattern already existed in the 1970s, and was confirmed during the 1980s. It is then possible to state that: “the metropolitan area is attracting population from the more remote regions of the South of Italy and from abroad, and is exporting population to areas close by, especially towards the communes within adjacent provinces” (ibidem). More precisely, the migrants who had moved to Milan after World War II were nearing the retirement age around the 80s; a considerable percentage went back “to the areas they had left some thirty years earlier”. Later, such outflows rapidly came to an end, while intra-metropolitan area movements started to increase. The growth characterised movements either from or towards the core, and even movements within the belt. These latter are considered to be interesting developments within the process of extension of Milan metropolitan area; however, similar trends are recognisable in the Roman areas as well (Cremaschi 1990).

In conclusion, tackling housing practices in perspective, a clear-cut distinction should be made between early and mature modernisation (when industry and city grew-up together and new communities were created in the surroundings of major cities), and post-industrial cities. Contemporary housing renews the variety of “dwelling rationalities” against and over the simplified opposition between individualism and collectivism embodied by the “modernist” architecture (stigmatised as narrower and more single minded than the “modern project” of housing: Tosi 1994a and 1995).

Post-industrial societies bring industry and towns to separate, while concerns with the working and the living become more and more independent. As a consequence, wide ranges of settlements, neither urban nor rural, are introduced. City and neighbourhood -as the spatial equivalent of society and community- tend to be useless concepts, as the standard model for urban and housing policies has changed. They have been substituted by a wider concern with the framing of large “scattered semi urban environment” (Coppo and Cremaschi 1994).

The structural change in metropolitan development trends led to a major shift in housing policy guidelines: the effacement of the neighbourhood concern that was the dominating problem during the fifties and sixties. Neighbourhood and community policies have long since been neglected, but originally they were intended as a programme to promote urban solidarity. A concern with the “locale” dimension in cities had not re-appeared until very recently. And issues related to community problems have begun to be perceived as a consequence of the fall in urban quality, and of the financial crisis of public housing.

A concern with local issues is growing in Italy too. For many years Italian housing policies were characterised by a marked degree of ambiguousness: the major example is the misleading overlap between support for the building industry and social solidarity, which has brought about an incongruent and haphazard social distribution of the benefits and disadvantages, together with many oversights at macro-economic level with regard to redistribution.

Furthermore, the redefinition of the relationship between inner city and suburbs seems give rise to a new element in the discussion: decentralisation entails considering public intervention in a more advanced configuration than in the one represented by the state model. It is reasonable to think that a change is required in the forms of intervention and in the technical tools themselves: one crucial issue is the establishment of new rules of coexistence and convenience for both public and private operators; another point of equal vital importance is the construction of new local agencies able to respond to different reasoning processes.

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